tv C-SPAN Weekend CSPAN December 27, 2009 6:00am-7:00am EST
time to get on with his own operation to report independently to london, to look for resources independently from london and to report to bremer, but we saw each other's telegrams and talked when necessary when we could help each other and i supported him with bremer when he wanted that and i supported him with london less often when he needed that, but on occasions he did need to make an impact on london because he didn't have enough resources. but on the whole, i think you should take my answer to indicate that we worked fairly separately and we didn't have daily contact on what was going on from my point of view in basra and his point of view in the rest of iraq. . .
before i got there within four days of the ambassador bremer arriving. i met the consequences of that. this was a balanced and understandable decision that the shia politicians in particular were strongly against bringing ex-baathists into the government council and ambassador bremer made quite a careful judgment of how far he could go with de-baathification. what didn't happen was to define people to run the government
were not baathists and the decree was issued before a clear route had been found to filling positions in the minimum government of iraq. there was a mdecree defending the iraqi army. there was a failure to fill the gaps which those institutions performed in iraq through any otherafñ means which should have made them think about the wisdom of those two decrease or the timing of them. when i arrived, ambassador bremer was handing over the implementation of the decree to an iraqi committee, in my view, de =baathification was taken to
four for the sensible administration of a wreck including in the academic and legal and other professions and in the civil service. we needed the iraqi middle-class to function if it was to administer properly. we all tried to persuade ambassador bremer and mr.challaby to allow more baathists if they were not senior baathists. to some extent some ambassador bremer medicated the defense of his decree through the implementation of it. >> was there an impact of an operational level and not a strategic level?
>> yes, there were extremely very effectively under very trying circumstances. >> how were they would directing within the cpa? what areas where the country on. ? >> any other american within the cpa was considered integrated into the process. the two younger officers we had in the process, one of them have very good arabic speaker, the only good arabic speaker and the government section and his colleague were very effective younger members of the government's team. another one was the deputy administrator for operations under ambassador bremer, a
hugely trusted and regarded with great respect. there were many other btitons working in the cpa. if somebody did not fit, there were asked to move on but on the whole, that was only a tiny proportion of our 100 or so people operating there. >> you begin to touch earlier on the political process. >> the focus of your influence on iraqi politics was the achievement on november 5 team of getting -- november 15 of getting the transition. could you give us a narrative as to how that was accomplished
given the fact that the iraqi constitution was drawn up by the iraqis. how do you get from ambassador bremer's of view to november 15? >> the still make was that ambassador bremer did not not won elections to take place in a wreck without constitutional principles being laid down which would make it clear what those elections were all about. that was a perfectly reasonable approach. he did not want i wrecks constitution to be written by or influenced by non-iraqis. he wanted iraqis to be elected to draw up the constitution, among other things.
that was a stalemate. it was some months before ambassador bremer decided that the seven-step plan as heat -- as had been approved, would not work in the order he had drawn up. we went through a number of discussions amongst ourselves with the iraqi government consul as to how we could get around sustani, which was out it was expressed and we tried various approaches. when it was clear that ayatollah sustani not back down and the religious shia members would not do anything but support sustani, we had to find another route around it.
there was a well-known meeting amongst those who were participating when i and eventually stopped listening between the ambassador bremer and the iraqi council and interjected that when there was a chicken and egg problem, one way to get through is to design a double circuit of the track, two chickens and two eggs. we designed the process of drawing up some preliminary
constitutional principles through an administrative law leading to a first round of elections after which there would be the right to have a proper constitution by elected officials leading to a second round of elections under the constitution. that was the heart of the november 15 agreement. >> was the only means of communication communicating with ayatollah sustani through the shia idc? >> there was no way i was going to succeed in getting a private conversation with the ayatollah usustani who refused to see the administrator for the communication was either through the shia members of the governing council or the written word because ambassador bremer
did, on rare occasions, write to him and got a message back through his seven acolytes. -- through his own acolytes' or through third parties. later in the process, when the u.n. ambassador became part of the action, he had an adviser, a lebanese adviser, who himself went down to see ayatollah sustani and became a conduit. ambassador bremer had one other arab adviser who was a conduit to the ayatollah. >> the ayatollah did not see the next ambassador? >> yes, the ayatollah did see him. it was a deliberate move not to deal with the occupying authority. >> thank you.
there was not only the need to get around the fatwa in the shia interest but man interests in uididc. how much of your time when into managing the relationships within the council itself in order to arrive at the conclusion of november 15? >> i understood my primary task in practice as being to help make the political process work. without that, there was no structure for anything else we did. without that, we would not get out of iraq. i got to know all members of the governing council. and their immediate advisers and deputies. i would have my own separate conversations with them. i would occasionally -- i would always attend meetings of the
governing council administrator. i occasionally chaired meetings of the governing council when the administrator was absent. i dealt with the whole political substance of what we're talking about in those ways. i found that i had a particular work to do with the kurdish members of the governing council. , partly because the arab-iraq- kyrgyzstan dichotomy was a part of the substance because of the british relationship with the kurdish nation. i also did work with the senior members of the governing council who wanted to another channel of political discussion than the administrator which was viewed with some distaste by
some members, the american members of the cpa and the administrator but i was there and i had my government's authority to do that and they could not prevent me from doing it. >> that was a function of you not becoming a deputy? >> if i had been a deputy, i still would have participated. those conversations helped to ease the members of the governing council around ambassador bremer's problems. it was, in my view, loyal to the overall mission of the administrator and helped him achieve the november 15 agreement and later, the transitional administrative law. >> looking back to your time there, what was the most important achievement in making progress under the cpa?
>> the political process that we set through those two organs have lasted to this day. as the basis for the political development of iraq around which security, the economy, the social situation had to circulate. i regard that as a success for the cpa under ambassador bremer. i should comment here, i think, that through his year as administrator, ambassador bremer increasingly came to understand what was necessary to develop the process of returning iraq to its own sovereignty and its own people in a way which washington did not always understand, to the degree which
ambassador bremer found that the more that he understood the decisions had to be taken in iraq and the basis of what would work in the ground, the more distant was greeted between him and washington. >> that is not -- that is not an untypical predicament, i think. >> i'm curious about the question of your own role. we have talked about it but it is interesting. as you have explained, iraq and afghanistan was a joint occupational situation. you described how the two countries were pretty well integrated. there is this question hanging
over all of this of leadership. you thought about loyalty to an american plan. this was not a joint american plan, it was an american plan. is that fair? >> yes, i was at the u.s. when the seven-step plan was drafted and agreed -- i am sure sir john sawyers had an input into that plan but i do not see how that happened and what conversation led behind it. you're absolutely right -- in theory, we were co-response will for iraq but in practice, we were 1/10 or less of the practical capacity to do things in iraq. the practical normally was more influential than the theoretical in the way things
happened. >> you have described a world to pick up for yourself which sounds like picking up where you left off in the un except in very different circumstances. that was working closely with the political leaders that you found iran to who may or may have not agreed with what the uk or the americans doing but five -- tried to find a negotiated with through. was this a particular application of the skills you brought to baghdad? >> you tend to use the skills you have home over the years instead of inventing new ones. working with a superpower that likes to do things its own way
and with the tough decisions being taken by a closed circuit of americans and working with reality, those two things, the brits probably work as well with the americans as anybody does in an international situation. the americans were extremely generous to us in terms of integrating us into the system in the cpa. i was in an office within ambassador bremer's area of the republican palace. his office was at one end of a complex and our joint private office, which you might call a third room, was between us and i was in sitcoms the deputy office at the other end of the palace. we were in the same complex. we saw a lot of each other's
material when we decided to show it to each other. there was a lot of america and the true -- material that i never saw. there was a good spirit in the cpa of international cooperation but no question that all that we were working to an american leadership. that american leadership was a vociferous. the leadership of the military was different from the leadership of the civilian team. the leadership of the whole business from the pentagon in washington was different from the state department and not working well with the state department which produced the arab specialists that occasionally or were or were not part of professor bernard's team. i had to get my influence going in that system as best i could by judging what was happening against what the reality on the ground was going to make up and
whether we like it or not. where the american decisions did not seem to accord with where gravity was taking event on the ground, i would try to use aspects of the situation to get the americans to adjust their policy because that backed up the arguments i was making. i was used to doing that in the security council. that helped because the americans are and were capable of taking decisions in the american domestic context that were not necessarily going to produce the results that they really wanted on the ground in a country like iraq. i was trying to mend the process when i saw that as being likely to happen. >> you described earlier that his meeting with the prime minister in early september where he put the lot of stress on improving the peace force.
everything we have heard about the iraqi people police force, that was unrealistic. how was the unreality of expectations in london looked at? it must become apparent as soon as you go to baghdad, the role the peace force had played an outdated the paramilitary force was and how difficult it would be to build up anything for iraqi society effectively. >> it must have been just as difficult for london as a was for me in baghdad. i took the approach that if i disagree with something that was happening on the ground and was trying to change it, that i would not go weeping to london about it and ask them to get washington to persuade
ambassador bremer to do something differently. it was my job to persuade our ambassador bremer or we had to go along with decisions. london had a limited capacity and which to disagree with washington because washington was in the lead. we had a relatively poor input into pentagon decision making about which you have heard from other witnesses. therefore, there was a sense of frustration in london that we could not always persuade the americans to do what might be our preference because they were in charge and they were going to do their own thing anyway and we had him try to make it work on the ground. there was a sense of frustration in both places some things were going reasonably well but the police area was not one of them. frankly, in 2009, it still isn't one of them. it never became right and we never got iraqis to create a
police force of the strength of saddam's. the police training exercise was actually run by an extremely competent british former chief constable, douglas brand, who the americans accused respected. he had hardly any resources to do with. he had to invent a training program which we eventually did with jordan which produced a far lower number of recruits going through the system in for a shoe -- far too short a training time and was realistic to create a decent police force on the ground. the sense of party that we have from our two capitals militated against the production of well- trained, well-b haven policeman on the ground. there was a tension there. >> into that gap, where there
was a police force, the americans because of the sunni trialge, the british forces had to go. did you have any sense of how the people who were interrogated handle? >> not the time because there were no british in that system. the prison system was run by the american military primarily in the american area. i cannot speak for mmd s.e.. they must of had detention facility but i regard that separate from the question you're asking. i had no input into those arrangements. if ambassador bremer had an input into them because they were being run by the u.s. military and he did not have direct responsibility for them, i was not brought into those discussions.
we had some concerns that too many detainees were being held without being processed through the courts. this was something that anne cluid, as the special envoy for human rights affairs was concerned with. we would raise those concerns with the ambassador bremer and with general sanchez, the american commander on the ground to see if more people could be put through the courts so that innocent people were not held for longer than necessary. we only had a limited amount of success in that area. we did not have day-to-day site of what was going on. >> a abu ghraib game after you had left -- of a great came after you left. the military work -- aby ghraib
abu ghraib happened after you left. were you made aware of this committee a disaster in terms of the fact that this was not the way that we were supposed to be behaving? >> as it happened, i was not made aware for two reasons. one was that the international committee of the red cross did not send a copy of the report even though the u.k. was co- response will in iraq. -- responsible in iraq. because i understood or was told by my own legal adviser that
there might be questions about the uk + responsibility for the detention facilities in mmd se, i got my legal adviser to purloin a writ -- a copy of the report from his contacts in the cpa, go through it, while i was away on a visit elsewhere, and check what was relevant for british concerns and make sure that those parts were reported back to london and to the ministry of defence which you did. he did not go through the rest of the report or give me any other indication that there were general questions here about the overall administration of iraq that might arise and so i missed an opportunity to focus on that. >> the senior british officers did not convey this to you? >> they did not. >> you were not able to give london and a warning that this issue is likely to blow up but
some time? >> i do not know whether london of the west got a full copy of the report. i think we sent them the parts of the report that affected british responsibility. you would have to ask other people whether they saw the full report. when the issue of although gray became one republic, that was a surprise and shock to me. >> and i ask for more on the civil-military relationship? you have given an indication that there was very little prospect of an extra american forces being brought in. we have also heard from military officers and non-military officers a sense of surprise in the shift in strategy in november, 2004.
-- november, -- september, 2003. as they were getting on top of things, all the sudden the united states when often a different direction. we also heard that sir hillary thought they were making progress with the cpa in the south in terms of what he was doing. this sudden change in strategy made his work less interesting, shall we say, than before. did you get a sense of the affected change in strategy in november as likely to have these sort of consequences and losing the momentum that was built up. ? >> that description does not sound accurate to me.
the security situation was gradually getting worse and we expected there to be a huge wave of incidents during the month of ramadan which that year was most of october, i think september into the end of october. that did not happen except in one or two areas. there were two things around november that you may be referring to one was a decision by ambassador bremer that he would not delegate responsibility to the military and civilian governor- administrators nor would he give them the amount of money they were asking for to try and deal with their local situation more effectively.
general petraeus had done this in mosul in the early stages. there is quite a story to this. the cpa had occasional meetings of the regional coordinators and the regional military commanders in baghdad to look at the whole situation in iraq. ambassador bremer ran and those meetings very top down and there was some dissatisfaction from the regional commanders and the regional administrators that they were not being allowed to do the things they thought would be most effective in their areas. they did not get the authority of the administration to do their own thing. >> major general david petraeus tended to do his own thing on the ground to the greatest degree possible and showed me
how intangibles -- alan intelligent independent general could produce an effect in the mosul region which was positive. others were more pork -- forceful in their military approach and in less resourceful in fighting money to feed into the local community. there was a sense of dissatisfaction in the whole area. i do not think there was a strategic change in november but there were adjustments to tactics and there were failures of the administrator to accept the wise advice of his regional commanders to do things rolla differently which are regarded as a pity but that's the way i would say it. >> i was thinking of what became apparent after november -- the move to elections the next year in the sense that the cba's days were numbered and their ability to carry on with momentum to take the lead in running the country almost
became a lame duck as 2004 started. >> i think adjustments were made after the november 15 agreement. at the same time, ambassador bremer had a decision from washington as to what the and overtime would be with discussion with the united kingdom. at the end of june, 2004, it was decided upon. that meant that the lead out time had to be planned and a more definite way. ambassador bremer was clear that there should not be local elections because that would interfere with the process of the national elections he was trying to plan and the agreement on the transitional
administrative law. the industry is had done good work to get democracy going in the localities which i and others felt or conducive to the way we wanted iraq to go. that was brought to a halt by the change of tactics in designing up to june, 2004. yes, that was true. >> he felt that this meant "a lot of good work that was under way lost momentum at that point, concerning that. >> yes, and you also heard from sir hillary in his desperate search for resources. he knew he needed to do but didn't have the resources to do it. >> did you see part of your role to persuade the master drummer
for resources to go to the south? waxi wasn't asked by london to do that because i thought london was beating resources to the south. i asked the occasional question about whether more than 2% of the overall american resources should go into this very important region in the south. a bit of money started flowing to this out but not much more than that. there was still that separation in the american mind between the british area and the rest of iraq. >> this illustrates the whole problem. the british ferry was dependent still on american resources because we did not have sufficient resources ourselves to do what was necessary we had not resourced it sufficiently. had to come from the money that the cpa had to spend.
you're not in a position as a joint administrator to say that's where it should go. it had to be done in this roundabout way from basura to washington and back to baghdad? >> yes, i was not in a position to do that. ambassador bremer had been to congress and had got $18.7 billion out of the washington system and it was his job to -- very little of that was dispersed during the coalition period. he was feeding money into the north, the center and the northeast rather than into the south. perhaps, there is some things we have not gone into. maybe this would be a matter for private discussion. ike leggett is worth bringing out in the public discussions -- i think it is worth bringing out in the public discussions -- but in october, 2003, the whole
effort in iraq will be won or lost in the center. i saw london as being very concentrated on their particular responsibilities in the southeast. that was what the wednesday morning meeting that the chiefs of staff talked about. that is what the direct ad hoc committee talked about. i made the point to ministers that they need to pay more attention as to what was happening in the center and remember that although they had appointed me to represent the u.k. interest in the center and although we have the% of the responsibility, if we put into% of the resources to the all of iraq, i could not have 50% of people went on the ground for it was likely to have something closer to 5% of the influence because money means influence.
quantity means influence with the americans as much as argument or position of first allah. >> how much of that you think was understood when you sent it back in october and then left in march? >> i was personally never satisfied that london focused enough on the center. we had excellent major generals as number 2 to the major military commander in baghdad. we had good advisers to him and to me. but we did not have the weight or the resources to offer to the americans for the hall of by iraq to catch their attention when we had disagreements in policy. one of which was the putting down of evito over the disbanding of the public
economy in iraq under tom foley who was responsible for the economic situation in baghdad. that would create too much unemployment as a difficult period in iraq. that was the only formal veto that i put down. on the whole, we've always had to get our arguments for a constant reiteration by working different parts of the system by going to the iraqis and influencing them rather than anything top down. thank you. >> market -- -- martin -- >> you felt we were not bring in enough resources. not enough in police training,
not enough into the center, in order to have employees there. where was the blockage? why was the british, not producing enough results? >> it goes back to more than the british. the most basic error that was made in the whole planning for the post-conflict phase in iraq was not to upset the american military, the mission, of administering iraq after the war was over. in my view, general tommy franks was given the long mission to did wrong mission invade iraq, get rid of the saddam hussein and her turn it over to the minister is bridge
he should have been given the mission of getting rid of saddam,'s of fighting iraq, making sure that iraq was a secure military area and then handing over to civilian administrators. there was an under-resources and of the mission from the very beginning. london was not in the position or did not question that setting up missions. control of the security situation was lost from the earliest days after april 9 and was never recovered. you cannot do a political process or an economic process without security. in addition to that, as far as the political process was concerned, no iraqi leadership was identified in reality and with justification as being the leadership to which we would hand over in the phase four
perios. -- . . london was not sufficiently consulted on the setting of missions, on the change from oha to the cpa, from, to baghdad. and the setting up resources for the whole test. -- task. we were always, by experience in iraq, from history and in the nature of the british, more pessimistic about what was going to happen then were the americans. we never got the americans to understand that in the post- conflict area, they were taken on a more difficult mission than the invasion itself. that lay behind her absence of resources. -- our absence of resources.
you then have to add to that the reluctance of many government -- any government and every government in this country to spend resources when they do not necessarily see the proof of them being needed. it is in the nature of democracy to under-resource and not to preempt and not to ensure because the treasury will always argue against that. it is too expensive. as it happened, iraq became more expensive because we did not do those things because we did not in short, we carry our own insurance and it was very expensive. it was in the nature of the british regime not to cover every eventuality because fundamentally it was on a-- it was unaffordable. supplied the end but not the means? >> correct. >> in the fundamental fear it as you see it, -- failure>> at the
outset, you say that we were not consulted, were not sufficiently consulted. was that because at the highest levels we were not being assertive enough in putting forward our point of view and demanding to be consulted and is we have? -- had>> no, it is more complex than that. in the american view, we were very welcome and a very capable partner but we were very low quantity. i would not say junior partner partner. the pentagon was planning for this in the way that they did plan on the assumption that the united states might be the only country executing this plan to invade iraq and get rid of saddam hussein. you remember that secretary rumsfeld said in january or
february, 2003, that we will go and do this whether or not the british are with us. they were planning to do all thing, if necessary, whether or not they have allies. -- had allies. it is in the american frame of mind to do things on the basis of american decisionmaking, american resources, american self-reliance with other partners being very welcome to add things where they can but is mainly being an american enterprise -- >> if i could interrupt you. when the british government took the decision in different military options it was presented with to go for the largest, including a division level land force, a strong part of the argumentation was that this would give us a significant influence over the way the operation was conducted.
do you think that london failed to appreciate that despite that decision that we were a low- quantity partner, did you think we re -- did they think that we were a high-quantity part because of that? >> no, they would have to rely on good american decisionmaking and resource allocation to get this thing done well. in british terms, it was an enormous expedition, military expeditionary force to be sent to iraq to win one part of the country and hold that part of the country and if you look at the record of what we did in the southeast, we eventually did it very confidently up to a certain -- very confident play up to a certain point in time until our supplies ran out in iraq. it was a well executed job that the british did in the
southeast. but in doing that job in the southeast, we added very little to what the coalition as a whole is doing in the rest of iraq. >> it did not give us the big influence that we hoped it was going to give us? >> it gives the employees to -- it gave us the employees to make our own decisions in the southeast and to be relied upon by the americans to do that properly but it did not give us the weight of zero boys in baghdad for the whole administration of iraq -- the voice in baghdad for the whole administration of iraq. buy think london understood that. -- i think london understood that. >> you said that ambassador bremer did not show you the icrc report on abu ghraib when it was sent to him and you said there was a lot of american material that you never saw. to what extent did ambassador
bremer keeping fully briefed on what he was up to? keep you fully briefed on what he was up to? >> he did not keep me fully briefed. he never intended that. the non-americans in the cpa and quite a few of the americans, did not see anything of the american spending of money and budget allocations gori we were not consulted on the budget allocations that bremer and others prepared for the spending of american and iraqi money in iraq. we did not seek anything whatsoever in the oil sector. they kept that very closely american because they wanted to run the oil sector. there were australians and poles and others at senior levels who were advising them on some aspects of this but no americans were taken into the american confidence on the
spending of money and the management of the oil sector in iraq. those are two of the purest examples of how partial the partnership was on the ground with the americans. >> why were they seeking to have this control of the oil sector? >> i think they felt that they understood the oil sector. they brought in american oil executives to invite them on -- advise them on this and run that part cpa. they knew that management of the oil sector would be vital to the supply of finance into the iraqi system and wanted to be responsible for it themselves. there might have been a minor ankle of thinking that they wanted access to the contracts that might come out of the oil
sector and the iraqi economy at a subsequent period but the americans were doing 95% of the work and putting in 95% of the money. i would not like to say that they were not justified in taking that approach. >> would you regard this as a minor aspect of this? >> the americans had no intention to take over and on the oil sector. -- own the oil sector. that was always a canard in public criticism terms of what the invasion was about. it was not about oil. i think they just felt this was such an important area that they would run it themselves. they ran the replacement of the currency with immense confidence and efficiency, run by an -- brit on board with the team.
>> in your contacts with british and american military commanders, did you feel at the time you were there that they would have liked to have had substantially more troops on the ground to carry out the task they were big -- being expected to carry out? >> yes, they were always under- resourced and ambassador bremer has spoken in public since that time that he himself asked for a larger number of troops in the summer of 2003. stretched. it was clear to them about the borders were open and they did not have the troops to guard the ammunition dumps which have more than 1 million tons of military explosives, and ammunition in them. there were not able to police the streets. they were assuming that the iraqis would do a lot of this
themselves with in the event that it was a misplaced assumption. on the ground they had. >> the outgoing chairman had warned the senate in february of that year that they were going to make hundreds of thousands of people to deal with the task after the event. he had been a rubbished at the time for saying this? >> he thought a half a million troops would be necessary for the post-conflict and depurate secretary wolfowitz said that was ridiculous. how can you need more troops for after the conflict and for the conflict? >> if you have been asked in september of 2003 which of the two or write?
-- which of the two were corrected? >> it was my view throughout this that more troops should have been allocated from the>> time is about to run out. we have benefited enormously from two rounds of testimony from a like to ask two questions about your overall view. throughout the whole process in which you were involved, do you feel that the united kingdom had a significant impact on the process of policy formation in the united states towards iraq? you have talked about one specific set out vetoes looking at it in a broader sense, did we succeed in influencing it? >> yes, we influenced it in certain detailed ways but that cannot hide the fact that we were uncomfortable about the low level of planning for the post-conflict period, had worries abou under-resourceing,
and sometimes were not given an opportunity to explain to the americans why we thought it should be done differently. in that very major respect, i think our influence was too low but it was too low for the reason that we were a minor partner, in resource terms. >> finally, you were there in the period where you described it as a catastrophic success of winning the war so quickly. and we were paying the price or the -- of the failure of and we were essentially making it up as we went along in a very different environment than we expected. you draw a number of important lessons and we are on the lessons large exercise.
are there any other lessons for future policy making that you would draw from the whole of iraq experience? >> i think there are a number of lessons. the full range of them will probably need another session. there are two in particular -- one is to regard the aftermath as just as important a mission as the military action. secondly, to put security first because nothing can be done in the political and economic sphere without security. third, to seek as wide as possible and international influence into an international operation of this kind with the legitimacy that would lead to that and which flows from that. and fourthly, to be much more aware of where the gaps are and
where the limitations will be and try to address those early in security, political resource, economic and other terms before you begin. this was clearly to rest and exercise -- too rushed an exercise on the ground which some people had been predicting would be as difficult as it was. to have this degree of mismatch is something that has to be avoided in the future. >> thank you. >> thank-you, sir jeremy. i think this has given you the opportunity to make a final observations for the session. there may be more to say. with that, can i say one thing for the record? i think you used the term "third role?" -- can you explain what that is? third>>an fco section was composed of the head of that
section, the deputy head of that section and the third room which was the engine room where the bureaucracy gets done. >> thank you. we thank you and to all of those who have attended throughout this morning. can i close this session? the next hearing will start at 2:00 this afternoon when we will be hearing from lieutenant general william rollo and lieutenant general cooper. they both commanded and they had a senior role in baghdad later on. in the course of this morning, we heard about the united kingdom triangle. we shall be hearing about that tomorrow afternoon. that is a trailer for the afternoon session tomorrow.
that concludes this morning's session. i would like to say that i interrupted the broadcast briefly this morning because there was a mention of sensitive information as it is defined in our published protocols so we had to enter a briefly, thank you. [captioning performed by national captioning institute] [captions copyright national cable satellite corp. 2009] >> coming up, [captioning performed by national captioning institute] "washington journal" this morning on "washington journal," a discussion on foreign policy.